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RESEARCH PAPER
Unintended consequences: institutional artefacts, closure mechanisms and the
performance gap
Philippa Boyd and Libby Schweber
School of the Built Environment, University of Reading, Reading, UK
ABSTRACT
Renewable technologies often feature in policies to improve the energy efficiency of buildings.
Designers introduce predicted energy values for specific technologies, but are surprised when
the technologies fail to perform as expected. Three building projects are used to explore the
effect of construction processes on the energy performance of building-integrated photovoltaic
(BIPV) technology. In two cases BIPV failed to deliver expected energy generation, while in the
third, dramatic changes in project processes and technical specifications were needed to achieve
the specified output. A social construction of technology (SCOT) analysis documents how the
energy generation of BIPV disappeared from view at certain points as actors focused on building
features. A contribution is made to the theoretical development of SCOT by responding to two
issues: privileging of cognitive closure mechanisms and the neglect of institutional analysis. The
concept of inflection mechanisms is introduced as a second type of closure mechanism. More
specifically, the role of institutional artefacts (e.g. planning requirements and schedules) in the
construction process is found to contribute to the performance gap. To reduce the ‘performance
gap’, practitioners need to focus on the distribution of design responsibility, sequencing of work
and the location of expertise.
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Introduction
This paper is about how plans for the energy generation
of renewable technologies often fail to deliver due to a
myriad of seemingly unconnected decisions and a suc-
cession of unintended consequences. The construction
sector is consistently identified as critical for sustainable
development in general and for energy savings in par-
ticular (IPCC, 2007). While a wide range of technical sol-
utions have been proposed (including better fabric
design and renewable technologies), policy-makers and
sustainably minded professionals are increasingly con-
cerned by the failure of many of these formulae to deliver
on their promise (Palmer, Armit, & Terry, 2016; Zga-
jewski, 2015). The term ‘performance gap’ captures this
concern. While it is generally defined as the gap between
the energy performance of a building as designed and as
built, the term has also come to signal a general frustra-
tion with the underperformance of supposedly green
buildings. Within that conversation, renewable technol-
ogies occupy pride of place for both their promise and
the disappointment over their performance in use.
Most discussions of the performance gap focus on
either energy modelling or building occupants and
their engagement with supposedly green buildings.
More recently, construction professionals have begun
to reflect on their own contribution to this phenomenon.
A report by the Zero Carbon Hub (ZCH) focused on
‘how and where the Performance Gap occurs within
the current housebuilding process’ (ZCH, 2014, p. 2).
The report identified 15 issues for priority action, 17
issues as a priority for research and 23 issues to watch,
each corresponding to different stages in the building
process. Stages included: concept design and planning,
detailed design, procurement, construction and commis-
sioning, and verification and testing. This paper contrib-
utes to that work by analyzing the effects of project and
construction processes on energy performance of BIPV
systems at handover. Whereas the ZCH report sought
to develop a comprehensive list of discrete factors,
mapped onto a prespecified set of stages, this paper
adopts a more holistic approach. As such, the current
paper is both narrower and broader than the ZCH
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report. It is narrower as its focus is on a single technology
(BIPV) and three building projects. It is broader as it
explores the dynamic interaction between seemingly dis-
crete issues and considerations, project stages and the
resulting performance.
The choice of BIPV for this study lies in its integrated
character, such that construction professionals and
building design considerations are necessarily involved
in the optimization of the technology. Far from a unique
characteristic, a number of renewable technologies,
including ground-source heat pumps and thermal
mass-storage systems, share this feature. To signal the
physical integration of the technology into the building,
the paper takes as its technical object the BIPV system
and its interfaces with the building (referred to as the
BIPV/building).
The paper begins with a simple question: how does
BIPV come to deliver less energy than initially expected
(or than it potentially could) on three building projects?
In two of the three cases, the energy generation of the
BIPV/building was negligible, whereas in the third it
was significant, but involved significant changes to the
‘business-as-usual’ project processes. The comparison
across three cases serves to identify a number of con-
struction-related considerations that affect the perform-
ance gap for BIPV in particular and building integrated
renewable technologies in general.
A social construction of technology (SCOT) approach
is adopted to explore the energy performance of BIPV.
SCOT is one of a number of micro-level network theories
used to explore the social construction of technology. An
initial pilot study was used to develop the basic approach
(Boyd, Larsen, & Schweber, 2015). It focused on the mul-
tiplicity of technological frames informing the ongoing
development of BIPV/buildings. While it introduced
the idea that institutional artefacts such as project sche-
dules affect the configuration of BIPV/building, the
absence of holistic case studies precluded an exploration
of this suggestion. The current paper draws on the find-
ings from a much more rigorous and extensive SCOT
analysis of three building projects (Boyd, 2016). Theor-
etically, its contribution lies in the identification of a
set of inflection mechanisms that capture the way in
which institutional artefacts enter into ongoing nego-
tiations over the BIPV/building and ultimately affect
BIPV performance.
The paper is structured as follows. First, a brief over-
view is presented of the literature on green building and
the challenges that construction professionals face. This
literature underlines the importance of extra-technical
considerations in the incorporation of renewable tech-
nologies into buildings. This is followed by a brief discus-
sion of the literature on the performance gap and, more
specifically, those studies highlighting the contribution
of the design and construction process. The literature
review concludes with a discussion of SCOT and its
use in this paper. Key features include: a focus on a suc-
cession of problem/solution chains, the documentation
of unintended consequences; attention to closure mech-
anisms; and a bounded concept of a network (which ren-
ders visible the effect of professional conventions and
external requirements). For a more in-depth discussion
of the difference between SCOT and other socio-techni-
cal network approaches including actor–network theory
(Latour, 2005) and large systems technical analysis
(Hughes, 1983), see Appendix A in the supplemental
data online.
Building-integrated photovoltaic (BIPV)
technology: background and context
Photovoltaic (PV) technology uses a suite of technologies
to generate electricity from solar radiation. PV systems
consist of: the PV cells, which convert solar radiation
into electricity; the matrix, usually glass, in which they
are embedded (often referred to as ‘solar panels’); cables,
which carry the direct current (DC) power from the
panels; inverters, which convert the DC electricity to
alternating current (AC); and cabling from the inverters
to the standard supply metering system. To optimize
electricity generation, each part of the system must be
matched. The way in which strings of cells are wired
together, the sizing of the inverters and the overall length
of wiring runs have considerable impact on the overall
generation potential of the BIPV system. Electricity
from PV systems can be used to power the building
where it is installed or can be exported to the grid. PV
systems are installed in two main ways: building-applied
photovoltaics (BAPV) and BIPV. The technologies
remain similar, but the challenges of their installation
differ greatly (Holden & Abhilash, 2014).
BAPVs are usually situated on roofs. The PV cells are
mounted on top of the roof membrane and are not part
of the structural element of the building. As the panels sit
on the roof, often on a framework, there is little impact
on the building structure and so BAPV are often installed
as a retrofit technology to existing buildings. The major
challenge for this technology is to maximize generation
from the number and position of the panels and to mini-
mize efficiency losses from cable runs by siting the inver-
ter as close to the panels as possible. Contracts for BAPV
installation in the UK are often turnkey and generally
regarded as an add-on to the main design and construc-
tion of the building (Holden & Abhilash, 2014).
BIPV is very similar to BAPV in terms of its com-
ponents. However, the key distinction for BIPV is that
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the PV panels are integrated into the fabric of the build-
ing rather than being placed on top of the structure. This
integration into the building structure can include using
BIPV in the roofs, windows, facades, louvres, brise-soleil
and rain screens. With BIPV, the panels replace conven-
tional building materials in part of the building, e.g. roof
tiles, facade panels or window glass. The function of the
panels is a combination of electricity generation, archi-
tectural aesthetic appeal and building function (in
terms of water tightness, strength, durability etc.).
Unlike BAPV, BIPV has many interfaces with the rest
of the building structure, which makes it both expensive
(by virtue of its bespoke nature) and complicated
(because of the number and type of interfaces with the
building) (Henemann, 2008). In the UK, BIPV is gener-
ally restricted to commercial building projects, where
each building is uniquely designed and where the adap-
tability of BIPV installations allows the technology to fit
and contribute to the building architecture. The bespoke
nature of the technology and the knock-on effects of its
incorporation into a building project pose major chal-
lenges for construction professionals.
Literature review
The need for a socio-technical approach to the study of
green building and the performance gap has been widely
acknowledged. Within this literature, empirical case
study research has proved invaluable in exploring the
practical challenges that renewable technologies pose
for construction professionals. The discussion that fol-
lows focuses primarily on this work, although an over-
view of the literature has also been introduced to
identify the broader conversations to which these case
studies contribute.
Green building
The challenge of green building for construction pro-
fessionals has been periodically noted. Rohracher
(2001) published a general statement underlining the
multiple product and process challenges associated
with green building and calling for socio-technical
approach. Häkinnen and Belloni’s (2011) study of bar-
riers and drivers for sustainable buildings took up a simi-
lar call, as did Schweber and Haroglu’s (2014) research
into variations in the ‘fit’ between the Building Research
Establishment Environmental Assessment Method
(BREEAM) and the building process. A number of
studies focus on the role of one or more key actors in
achieving this aim. Gluch (2009) explored the role of
environmental managers, while Parag and Janda (2014)
highlighted the role of middle managers. This work has
similarly been matched by professional bodies interested
in promoting their members’ specific contribution. The
Specialist Engineering Alliance (Macmillan, 2009)
studied the complexity of the sustainable building supply
chain, whilst more technical guides identify the complex-
ity of interrelated components (e.g. BRE, EA Technology,
and Sundog Energy, 2002).
In most of this work, ‘green buildings’ are defined as
those that limit their negative environmental impact,
generally with reference to either waste, energy and/or
water; in almost all these studies, ‘integration’ is seen
to be the primary condition for success. A key difference
between these studies lies in the kind of ‘integration’ pro-
blem that they identify as critical and in the associated
solution which they propose. Rohracher (2001) identifies
the need to integrate different stakeholders within the
design process, whilst Häkinnen and Belloni (2011)
espouse the importance of integrating construction pro-
cesses. The SEA used a banner of ‘Sustainable Buildings
need integrated teams’ (Macmillan, 2009, p. 1) to high-
light the need for integrated delivery teams, whilst the
BRE (2002) guide signals a need for the integrated design
of system components. This paper introduces another
type of challenge by exploring the incorporation of inte-
grated renewable technologies. While it starts with a con-
cern for the physical integration of the BIPV technical
system into the building, the approach and findings
underline the interdependence of the different inte-
gration issues.
As these examples all illustrate, case study research
has proved critical in developing a sector-specific under-
standing of the challenges of green building. Contri-
butions can be divided into a managerialist literature
focused on developing frameworks, decision-making
tools and evaluation methods, and a more exploratory
literature concerned with identifying the barriers to
and opportunities for ‘green building’.
In terms of research approach, managerialist studies
tend to involve some type of experimental research
design, be it a modelling or a simulation exercise. In
these studies, empirical case studies provide an opportu-
nity to develop and test management and assessment
methods. For example Von Malmborg and Forsberg
(2003) use life cycle analysis (LCA) to evaluate different
heat and electricity mixes in three commercial buildings.
Hassan (2006) builds on earlier attempts to integrate
existing management tools, including total quality man-
agement (TQM), LCA and value for money (VFM),
amongst others, to develop a managerial framework
aimed at supporting green building. Other studies seek
to develop multi-criteria decision-making tools (Lang-
ston, 2013; Matar, Georgy, & Ibrahim, 2008; Shen &
Walker, 2001). In these studies, the technology is treated
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as a fixed component that, once selected, plays no further
part in the development of the building. This is clearly
evidenced in the neglect of challenges concerning the
introduction or installation of renewable technologies.
This omission can partly be explained by a radical dis-
tinction between technical and social dimensions and a
privileging of the choice of either technologies or social
factors, such as communication and skills.
In contrast, empirical case studies tend to analyse
‘real-life’ projects. A review of the literature revealed a
surprisingly small number of this type of paper. Notable
exceptions included Fedoruk, Cole, Robinson, and
Cayuela (2015), Brown and Vergragt (2008), and Albino
and Berardi (2012). Each of these papers documents the
complexity of both the technology and the project
environment. They also draw attention to the ongoing
need for fine-tuning and to the obstacles that conven-
tional construction management processes pose. This
understanding, that both social and technical issues are
at play, reinforces the need for further exploration. In
particular, this creates a space for an approach that
links the development of technology, ongoing building
design, the network of actors involved and the various
decisions that shape a building project.
The ‘performance gap’
The performance-gap literature differs from the work on
green building in its exclusive focus on energy and in its
framing of the challenge as one of ‘sticking to the plan’.
The concept of the performance gap refers to the gap
between the intended energy performance of a building
(as designed) and the energy performance in use.
Research into the performance gap can be divided into
three categories: work on the modelling of energy per-
formance (De Wilde, 2014; Menezes, Cripps, Bouchla-
ghem, & Buswell, 2012), work on building occupants
and the effect of their behaviour on energy performance
in use (Ornetzeder & Rohracher, 2006; Sunikka-Blank &
Galvin, 2012), and a third small but growing literature on
the role of building delivery (Dainty, Thomson, & Fernie,
2013; Gorse et al., 2012).
Viewed from the perspective of the construction
industry, the energy performance of buildings is often
disappointing (Zgajewski, 2015). The concept of the ‘per-
formance gap’ rests on a particularly rigid, stylized
understanding of the construction process. It assumes
that building designs are fixed early on in the process
and treats subsequent changes (and in particular those
that affect the energy performance of the building) as a
problem. This image contrasts sharply with the experi-
ence of construction professionals whereby design
decisions continue to be made throughout the delivery
process, often for very good reasons, ranging from
changes in client funding and goals to unanticipated pro-
blems with the overlay of systems or procurement issues
(Hanna, Camlic, Peterson, & Nordheim, 2002). In this
sense, the performance gap is better understood as a
gap between energy performance as modelled (at a rela-
tively early point in the design process) and energy per-
formance in use. Moreover, performance-gap studies
tend to assume that the energy performance of a building
is a clearly understood parameter that is at the centre of
professional attention from initial concept through to the
commissioning of a building, whereas in fact the target is
not always clear, measureable, visible or consistent.
While the concept of a performance gap may not be
straightforward, empirical research into the problem
has enriched understanding of the implementation of
renewable technologies. Empirical case studies show
that adoption is not a simple, one-way process and this
points to the need to take into account standard building
practices and performance measurement (Fedoruk et al.,
2015).
Social construction of technology (SCOT)
SCOT is one of a number of socio-technical network
approaches that were introduced in the 1980s (see
Appendix A in the supplemental data online). While
the approach has developed considerably, this paper
builds on the early version. At its most general, SCOT
depicts the development of a technology as a contest
between different actors with different visions for its
form and use. Technological development is marked by
negotiations over a succession of problems and associ-
ated solutions (Bijker, 2010).
Within SCOT, acknowledgement of both the physical
aspect of technologies and their socio-technical nature
can be found in the analytical distinction between tech-
nical artefact (the early focus of SCOT research) and
technological system, both of which figure as possible
units of analysis (Bijker, 2010). Whereas ‘technical arte-
fact’ sets the shifting configuration of a set of interlocking
physical parts as a research object, ‘technological system’
takes the heterogeneous network of artefacts, meaning
and people as its object.
For the purposes of this paper, this distinction allows
for an analysis of the changing network around BIPV/
building conceptualized as both a technical artefact and
technological system. Analyzed as a technical artefact,
BIPV appears as a collection of discrete component
parts, the relationship between which changes as the
BIPV/building develops. Components include: panels;
inverters; wiring and control systems; as well as the
parts of the building that are directly affected by BIPV,
BUILDING RESEARCH & INFORMATION 13
such as the building facade or electrical system. It is the
panels in particular that are used to estimate the energy-
generation potential of the technology. This paper
explores the gap between initial expectations for the
technology and its generation potential at handover.
Analysed as a technological system, a BIPV/building is
characterized by a heterogeneous network of human
actors and physical and textual artefacts, which are con-
stituted around and constitute specific project/solution
chains. This model is useful as it allows for an identifi-
cation of the succession of negotiations shaping the
development of a BIPV/building and of the knock-on
effects of one problem/solution chain on subsequent
ones.
SCOT begins, like other network theories, with an
assumption of ‘interpretative flexibility’ (Bijker, 2010).
The concept refers to the multiplicity of different
interpretations which are ascribed to a technical artefact.
This means that for any given technological system,
different actors will define the technical artefact (around
which the technological system is elaborated), the pro-
blem under consideration and the range of possible sol-
utions differently. Viewed from this perspective, a SCOT
analysis focuses on how particular actors manage to
impose their interests and associated problem definitions
and solutions on the developing technological system.
As indicated above, theoretical generalization in
SCOT tends to be around mechanisms of closure
(Misa, 1992). The term points to the gradual movement
from negotiations and even competition for control over
the development of a technical artefact to (temporary)
closure. The point is not that the development is fixed
forever, but rather that at some point in time a particular
version comes to be taken for granted, such that sub-
sequent changes are defined relative to that version of
the technical artefact.
Initially, SCOT scholars privileged the role of under-
standings and meaning in the fixing of a particular tech-
nological system. One of the key criticisms of SCOT
concerns its neglect of structure. In a widely cited paper,
Klein and Kleinman (2002) point to the way in which
social structures ‘explain’ why some actors and techno-
logical frames ‘win out’ over others. A key point for this
paper concerns the attention they draw to structural fac-
tors affecting closure. These include power and depen-
dency relations between actors and institutional rules
governing decision-making (Klein & Kleinman, 2002,
p. 39). SCOT scholars responded to this and related criti-
cisms by exploring the role of power (Bijker, 2010; Bijker,
Hughes, & Pinch, 1987; Klein & Kleinman, 2002).
This paper, in contrast, picks up on Klein and Klein-
man’s (2002) second point, regarding the role of exter-
nally established (institutional) rules. More specifically,
it examines the way in which those rules enter into tech-
nological systems through the medium of textual arte-
facts. The term ‘institutional artefact’ is used to signal
the grounding of artefacts such as contracts in broader
institutional arrangements. A central argument in the
paper concerns the way in which these artefacts inflect
the ongoing definition of both problems and solution
sets. This effect is referred to as inflection mechanisms
to distinguish it from the more cognitively driven closure
mechanisms that most SCOT theorists address.
In contrast to the more familiar concepts of ‘inter-
mediary’ (Latour, 2005) and ‘boundary object’ (Star &
Griesemer, 1989), which link actors or networks together
without introducing new content or weighting outcomes,
‘institutional artefacts’ do both. They introduce rules that
have been set outside of the technological system with
the explicit intent of directing ongoing negotiations.
While those rules can be modified, it is only with great
effort and often involves an appeal to the relevant insti-
tutional body. A key contribution of this paper and of
empirical case studies more generally is to draw attention
to the numerous unintended consequences that such
rules and associated artefacts produce.
In sum, this paper contributes to the development of
SCOT by taking on two longstanding criticisms, namely
its privileging of cognitive closure mechanisms and
neglect of institutional analysis. It focuses on the effect
of textual artefacts that figure in the course of nego-
tiations around specific problems and solutions. While
the value or content of the artefacts are produced by
and through the network in which they figure, the type
of artefact and taken-for-granted assumptions of what
general form they should take are external to the net-
work. An analysis of these effects introduces a number
of often overlooked aspects of the performance gap; it
also contributes to theory development by adding a
second type of closure mechanism, namely inflection
mechanisms, to the SCOT toolbox. For further discus-
sion of the way in which SCOT informed the research
and the difference between SCOT and other networked
theories, such as ANT, see Appendix A in the sup-
plemental data online.
Methods
As indicated above, this paper uses data from a much lar-
ger SCOT analysis. Whereas that broader study explored
the co-development three BIPV systems and the buildings
inwhich theywere incorporated (Boyd, 2016), the focus of
this paper is on the effect of that process on the energy-
generation potential of BIPV. To select the cases, the
first author contacted a manufacturer of BIPV laminate
panels who provided contacts for five new-build
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commercial projects, three of whom agreed to participate
in the study. As indicated in Table 1, the building projects
shared certain features and differed in others. All three
were commercial buildings, all used the same laminate
supplier and all used design-and-build contracts (a pro-
curement method that supports early contractor involve-
ment). The projects differed in the function of the
buildings, the physical component of the building into
which BIPV was incorporated and the drivers for the spe-
cification of the BIPV system (Table 1).
Data for the study included 28 interviews and two
extended e-mail correspondences, conducted between
February 2013 and June 2015. For each project, a loose
type of snowball sampling was adopted (Bryman &
Bell, 2003); interviewees were asked for names of other
professionals involved in the ongoing development of
the particular BIPV/building. Sampling was considered
complete when no new names were suggested (Table 2).
Semi-structured interviews were used to collect data
on the co-development of each BIPV/building. The
structured but flexible nature of the method allowed
the interviewer to both explore the interviewees’ experi-
ence and query developments identified in previous
interviews (Bryman & Bell, 2003). Interviews lasted
between one and two hours and were recorded, tran-
scribed and anonymized.
Analysis initially focused on the development of
detailed SCOT diagrams detailing the succession of pro-
blem/solution chains contributing to the ongoing design
of three BIPV buildings. This use of SCOT diagrams is
novel; it was initially used as a pilot study (Boyd et al.,
2015) and mobilized in the broader research project (for
further explanation, see Appendix B in the supplemental
data online). For the purposes of this paper, the authors
focused on those problem/solution chains that directly
impacted on the energy-generation potential of the
BIPV/building. This produced a set of four to five pro-
blem/solution chains for each case. Each chain was then
analysed for its effect on the energy performance of the
BIPV system. Findings were captured in a detailed table,
which is reported in Appendix C in the supplemental
data online.
This analysis led to a focus on closure mechanisms in
general and the concept of institutional artefact in par-
ticular, and the table was revised to include these issues.
As the discussion that follows suggests, the same set of
Table 1. Summary of case studies.
Vogue Terrace Future Green Synergy Court
Use Commercial offices Science hub Medical research centre
BIPV system Brise-soleil louvres Windows Roof fins
Generation target None 50 m2 221 MWh
Planning permission 2007 2009 2010
Construction start 2014 2013 2011
Completion date 2016 2014 2016
Contract Design and build Design and build Design and build
Initial driver for BIPV Sustainability commitment
Modern look
Sustainability report
Funding requirement
Planning requirement (1% of building
energy use from renewables
BIPV energy generation at handover Reduced generation Minimal On-target generation
Note: BIPV = building-integrated photovoltaics.
Table 2. Interviewees by case study.
Vogue Terrace Future Green Synergy Court
Laminate supplier: sales manager Laminate supplier sales manager Laminate supplier: sales manager
Architect Architect Architect
Mechanical design consultant Louvre supplier sales manager
Electrical design consultant Louvre supplier managing director
Facade design director Louvre supplier design director
Facade sales manager Glazing supplier project manager Louvre supplier project manager
Facade project manager Main contractor design manager M&E consultant associate director
Facade consultant Main contractor M&E services manager M&E consultant electrical engineer
Main contractor design manager M&E contractor project manager Main contractor package manager
Main contractor M&E manager Site electrical contractor Electrical contractor lead engineer
Wiring contractor project manager Client project manager Client
Lettings manager Planning officer
Note: M&E = mechanical and electrical.
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mechanisms figured in each of the three cases, albeit with
different effects. The research design was approved by
the School of the Built Environment at the University
of Reading’s formal ethics procedure.
BIPV/building projects
This section presents each project in terms of the pro-
blem/solution chains that affected energy performance
of the BIPV system. The findings document how insti-
tutional artefacts inflected the definition of the problem
and the range of conceivable solutions, and the affect of
these (re-)definitions on the potential energy perform-
ance of the BIPV/building system at handover.
Vogue Terrace
Vogue Terrace is a commercial office building in Central
London. It was part of a three-phase refurbishment pro-
ject in which three adjacent blocks were reduced to a
skeleton and then reconstructed. Although not exactly
a new-build, the refurbishment was so extensive that it
fulfilled the criteria for project selection. BIPV technol-
ogy was incorporated in the brise-soleil louvres on the
south elevation of the building. The development started
in the mid-2000s, with Vogue Terrace being the last of
the three buildings to be constructed. Initial planning
permission for Vogue Terrace was granted in 2007;
work on site began in August 2014 with work on the
BIPV installation commencing in February 2015.
Local planning requirements in 2010 did not establish
particular generation targets for renewable energy;
instead, they called for a sustainability review that
included consideration of renewable technologies. The
decision to incorporate BIPV into the brise-soleil louvres
on the south elevation of Vogue Terrace was presented as
both satisfying these planning requirements and provid-
ing the building with an up-to-date look. At this point,
the energy-generation potential of the building was
framed in terms of the number of louvres on the
elevation of the building, rather than a specific gener-
ation figure.
During the initial design phase, the main contractor
carried out a cost analysis and identified the BIPV
brise-soleil louvres as a major source of capital expendi-
ture. The client insisted that the BIPV system be
retained, so the brise-soleil louvres were redesigned to
increase the number of PV cells in each louvre but reduce
the number of BIPV louvres. The intent was to maintain
the initial design output at a reduced cost.
A key moment in the story of energy generation on
the project came when the client insisted that the same
contractors be used on Vogue Terrace as had been
used in the previous phases of the project (which had
not included BIPV). This led to a chain of decisions
about who was responsible for what, which effectively
masked the interdependence between the BIPV brise-
soleil louvres and the BIPV wiring system.
This decision to use the same contractor locked in the
facade contractor who had no previous experience of
using BIPV. Recognizing their own lack of experience,
the facade supplier refused to include BIPV in their ten-
der response. To accommodate the facade supplier, the
main contractor redistributed the BIPV system across
other work packages. This involved a further division
of the BIPV contract into visible (panels and bracketry)
and invisible (wiring, inverters and cabling) sections.
As part of this decoupling of the BIPV system, and in
an effort to maintain profit margins for the contractor,
the PV panels were free-issued to the facade supplier
and the electrical portion of the system was put together
as a separate wiring package which was to be included in
the main electrical contract for the project. As the project
moved forward, project management conventions led
the main contractor to issue the electrical contract
work package as part of the main building electrical
work package, which was after the design of the brise-
soleil bracketry and frames had commenced. The sub-
sequent refusal of the main building electrical contractor
to take on the BIPV system design further blocked any
possibility of an integrated design for frames, bracketry
and wiring as the responsibility for the BIPV wiring
was further subcontracted.
The result was that the BIPV was treated as a bolt-on
installation, which lacked integrated design. The BIPV
louvres were bolted onto the glazing units and the wiring
was run vertically and externally up the building to the
roof-mounted inverters, impacting the aesthetics of the
building and increasing the length of wiring runs and
reducing the efficiency of the BIPV system. The lack of
an interface between the electrical and BIPV contracts
meant that the electricity generated by the BIPV system
was not part of the building’s energy-management sys-
tem and there were no integrated commissioning plans.
As this brief account indicates, in the case of Vogue
Terrace there were no planning requirements for energy
generation; the output of the BIPV system was only
roughly estimated and the actual output was never
measured. The second building project, Future Green,
offers a different path to the final BIPV performance gap.
Future Green
Future Green is a commercial science hub building set on
a 24-acre site in a large science park development in
northern England. The BIPV system was incorporated
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into the windows of the south elevation of the building.
Design for the project started in 2010; construction
began in late 2013 and the installation of BIPV was com-
pleted by August 2014; the Future Green project was
completed by November 2014. The project was a joint
partnership between a university, the city council and
several other partners.
Future Green used BIPV to win funding from the
European Regional Development Fund (ERDF); in
addition, BIPV was a sustainability statement and
attracted tenants to the building. Minimum require-
ments for ERDF funding included the achievement of
(at least) BREEAM Excellent and a rated energy per-
formance certificate (EPC) of at least ‘B’. The EPC cri-
teria for the inclusion of BIPV is expressed in area
(m2) of solar panels, rather than specifying energy gener-
ation in kilowatt-hours (kWh). This shift in the measure-
ment unit focused the project team on the physical
attributes of the solar panels, rather than on the electrical
output of the PV system as a whole. This shift in focus
was important because it signalled the moment that
energy generation was no longer a key factor for the pro-
ject team.
When it came to procurement decisions, a reliance on
pre-existing relationships masked the failure to design
the BIPV system. Towards the start of the project, the
main contractor apportioned work packages as though
the BIPV system were ‘just a set of windows’. The mech-
anical and electrical (M&E) engineer, with whom the
main contractor had worked previously, was given the
task of apportioning responsibility for the BIPV design,
which he divided into two parts. Responsibility for
design and procurement of the panels was assigned to
the facade contract, whilst responsibility for the electrical
aspect was included in the main project M&E contract
for internal work. Like the electrical contract, the facade
contract was awarded to a contractor with whom the
main contractor had collaborated in the past. One result
of this process was that the main contractor was not
aware of the requirement for design portions in either
of the subcontracts and missed the failure of both con-
tractors to design his assigned portion of the BIPV
system.
During the detailed design phase the architect (who
was not novated to the main contractor and therefore
acted independently), asked the facade supplier
to reposition the BIPV cells within the glazed units
so that the cell spacings were even and aesthetically
pleasing. The facade supplier deferred to the architect
in this decision even though as a result of the changes
the output from the cells was reduced. The facade con-
tractor subcontracted the glazing panels (including the
BIPV panels), assuming that they would be fitted into
the facade supplier’s frames on site. This division of
tasks and need to keep the project on schedule
obscured the need for detailed design of the BIPV
cell string configuration, which in turn led to a loss
of generation potential as the string configuration was
not optimized.
In order to reduce the effect of glare on the south and
west elevations, and in keeping with current architectural
practice, the architect had designed deep window reveals
in the facade without considering the effect of these
reveals on the BIPV generation. From the perspective
of BIPV generation, this had serious consequences as it
resulted in a total generation loss when the reveals cast
a shadow over any of the PV cells in a string.
The overall result was that the BIPV windows made a
strong, visible ‘green’ statement but their PV functional-
ity was severely compromised.
Synergy Court
Synergy Court is an interdisciplinary biomedical
research building in Central London that serves a medi-
cal research partnership between three national research
organizations and three universities. The BIPV system
was incorporated into roof fins on the building. Project
planning began in 2001 and planning permission was
granted in December 2010. Ground works began in
April 2011 and BIPV installation began in 2014. The esti-
mated completion date was early 2016.
Synergy Court was intended to be a flagship research
centre. Local, negotiated planning requirements
demanded that 1% of the electricity requirements of
the building be generated from renewable technology
onsite. BIPV was included in the building to meet
these conditions and as part of the client’s sustainability
strategy. The planning requirement fixed the energy gen-
eration target to 120 MWh.
An initial problem arose with the insistence of the
planning authority that the proposed shape of the build-
ing be modified. The redesigned building shape met the
planning authority’s requirements, but it also reduced
the area available for PV generation, making it difficult
to meet the generation targets. A fortunate by-product
of this tension was that it forced the detailed design of
the BIPV system on the agenda before the main contrac-
tor put the work packages out to tender. The work
packages initially included BIPV fins within the roof
louvre contract and the electrical work within the general
electrical contract. Because of the particularly stringent
generation target, all but one of the roof louvre suppliers
contacted refused to quote on the package. This led the
main contractor to issue a pre-contract design order
(PCSA) to one of the roof louvre suppliers for a more
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detailed design of the BIPV system before the tender
documents were finalized.
During the PCSA the roof louvre contractor suggested
an innovative redesign using micro-inverters and sub-
collectors which would meet the BIPV-generation target.
The contractor also insisted that the electrical work was
included within the louvre work package as a turnkey
contract. The main contractor agreed and as a result gen-
eration output and the BIPV system as a whole were
taken into account in each subsequent design and instal-
lation decision.
The result of this procurement decision was that the
BIPV system became an integral part of the building
and a flagship technology within the flagship building.
The generation potential of the BIPV system was
designed to meet 1% of the building’s energy needs
and was connected to the building’s energy management
system, allowing web monitoring of the electricity
generated.
Discussion
The comparison of three BIPV buildings presented
above draws attention to the relevance of planning
requirements, generation targets and the contractual dis-
tribution of responsibility for BIPV generation in par-
ticular and for the performance gap more generally. It
also highlights the reluctance of many subcontractors
to take responsibility for the design of this new technol-
ogy and the distortions introduced by the successive pas-
sing on of responsibility. Every time contractual
responsibility for the BIPV system design was either
divided up or passed on, the risk of invisibility and, as
a consequence the performance gap, increased. A sum-
mary of these three examples lays a basis for theorization
and more practical recommendations.
In Future Green the BIPV system was translated into
‘just a set of windows’. The result was that by the time
someone thought to evaluate the energy-generation
potential of the building, it was too late to intervene. In
Vogue Terrace, planning requirements and the client’s
brief initially kept the use of renewable technologies on
the agenda. The client’s concern for a modern look led
to the choice of BIPV brise-soleil louvres. However, at
a certain point, the client’s preference for a general con-
tractor with whom he had already worked and a compli-
cated set of contractual arrangements (motivated in part
by the reluctance of any of the relevant actors to take
responsibility for the BIPV design) effectively removed
the design of the BIPV system and energy generation
from the agenda. However, the Synergy Court building
evidenced a different approach. The energy generation
remained visible throughout this project. This effect
can be attributed to the way in which externally imposed
and challenging energy targets, together with early recog-
nition of the challenge which this posed (in part because
responsible contractors refused to take responsibility for
something they could not deliver) pushed the project
team to privilege BIPV system design over conventional
ways of working and contending considerations.
Institutional artefacts and inflection mechanisms
From a theoretical perspective the concept of insti-
tutional artefacts captures these dynamics and their con-
sequences for the performance gap. The term refers to
(predominantly) textual objects that introduce rules or
conventions into the development of the BIPV/building.
Examples include planning requirements, client require-
ments, cost analysis, work packages and schedules. As
these examples suggest, institutional artefacts are shaped
by rules or conventions, which exist prior to and inde-
pendent of any particular project. Relevant rules may
be formal or informal; the important point is that they
are socially recognized, such that deviation from them
is an active choice that needs to be justified.
The term ‘inflection mechanism’ points to the way in
which these institutional artefacts contribute to closure.
Whereas most SCOT analyses of closure mechanisms
focus on closure around a technology as a whole, the
focus in this paper has been on the closure of specific
problem/solution chains which contribute to that
broader process. Also, where most SCOT closure mech-
anisms work through the achievement of consensus,
inflection mechanisms affect technological development
through their effect on taken-for-granted assumptions.
More specifically, they affect decision-making by shifting
attention from one definition of a problem to another, by
drawing attention to certain issues and obscuring others,
and by circumscribing the set of conceivable options. In
contrast to cognitive closure mechanisms, their conse-
quences are often unintended and unanticipated.
Three types of inflection mechanisms
A review of institutional artefacts at play in the three
BIPV/building cases suggests three such mechanisms:
the (re)-specification of the unit of analysis, the impo-
sition of new parameters and recourse to convention.
In the projects described above, these mechanisms
worked to obscure and render visible both the BIPV sys-
tem design and its energy generation potential.
The (re)-specification of the unit of analysis refers to
the role of an institutional artefact in shifting the unit
used in the evaluation of energy generation. For example,
in the case of Future Green, the introduction of an EPC
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requirement of an ‘A’ or ‘B’ rating meant that area (m2)
was substituted for performance (KWh) in the specifica-
tion of installed cells. This effectively redefined the pro-
blem and eliminated the energy target. Conversely, in
Synergy Court the Merton Rule (a planning require-
ment) fixed a kWh target for PV, protecting the energy
target from attempts to unseat it. Finally, in Vogue Ter-
race the unit of analysis shifted from energy generation
to the number of brise-soleil louvres on the south
elevation. A key consequence was to shift the set of con-
ceivable solutions from BIPV system design to bracketry
and framework issues, which in turn delayed consider-
ation of BIPV wiring design until after louvre frames
and bracket design had been fixed.
The second, related mechanism involves the imposition
of new parameters. In this inflection mechanism, insti-
tutional artefacts introduce additional parameters into
the problem/solution chain. This effect can be seen in
the way in which a cost analysis introduced specific bud-
getary constraints into what had previously been a techni-
cal discussion over energy generation in both Future Green
and Vogue Terrace. The result in Future Green was to shift
the range of conceivable solutions to those that met the less
expensive EPC ‘B’ rating. In Vogue Terrace a parallel exer-
cise by the main contractor led to the free issue of BIPV
louvres to the facade contractor, at the expense of an inte-
grated technical design. Finally, in Vogue Terrace, the cli-
ent’s brief introduced aesthetic considerations that primed
over economic ones. More specifically, the client’s insis-
tence on a ‘modern’-looking building ensured the reten-
tion of BIPV brise-soleil in the louvres and kept energy
generation on the agenda, at least for the short-term.
A third inflection mechanism involves the primacy of
conventions, whether this is design conventions, project
conventions or simply past practice. This inflection
mechanism can be found in numerous moments in all
three projects. In Future Green, scheduling conventions
dictated a very short lead-in time for tendering. This in
turn deprived the team of time for reflection needed to
recognize and compensate for the way in which the
work packages cut across the BIPV system. The effect
was that both the electrical and the facade packages failed
to take into account the BIPV/building design. Similarly,
in the same project, conventional guidelines for how to
cope with glare for east/west facades and shading for
south-facing facades informed the set of conceivable sol-
utions to the profile of the window reveals (obscuring the
effect of shading on the energy generation potential of
the BIPV system). Whereas in these examples pro-
fessional conventions excluded energy generation from
the ongoing definition of problems and set of conceiva-
ble solution, in Synergy Court planning requirements in
the form of the Merton Rule kept them on the agenda.
One of the more striking indirect effects of this mech-
anism concerns the way in which professional conven-
tions shape the types of expertise available at any given
point in time and mask the absence of BIPV knowledge.
In Vogue Terrace, the client relied on the well-tested
method of hiring a general contractor with whom they
had worked previously. While this may have reassured
the client, it also created an expertise gap. In what
seems from the outside like a jumbled succession of sub-
contracts and work packages, the design of the BIPV
brise-soleil was passed like a hot potato from the archi-
tect to the main contractor to the facade supplier to
the laminate supplier to the electrical contractor and ulti-
mately to the BIPV wiring contractor. With each pass,
contractual arrangements decoupled the system design,
further diminishing the possibility that the experts,
when they were finally brought onto the project, could
salvage the energy-generation potential of the BIPV
system.
Similar impacts of conventions on the presence or
absence of technical expertise can be found in Future
Green. In keeping with convention, the main contractor
relied on the M&E design engineers to define and split
up the work packages, and the M&E engineers relied
on the M&E and facade subcontractors to each design
parts of the BIPV system, although neither had had
experience of BIPV systems. The scheduling conventions
of design-and-build contracts (a procurement type in
which the contractor is brought on relatively early in
the process and represents the client) relied on fast turn-
around of the tender process, which precluded detailed
design of the BIPV elements and masked the effect of
the deep window reveals on the energy-generation
potential. Each actor in the chain was convinced that
the non-existent BIPV expert was in charge of the system
design and that all would be well. In both Vogue Terrace
and Future Green, the way in which conventions shape
the types of expertise available resulted in BIPV systems
being installed without ever having been designed. For a
complete table of these mechanisms and their effect on
specific projects and problem/solution chains, see
Appendix C in the supplemental data online.
Effects of inflection mechanisms on the
performance gap
The identification of three common inflection mechan-
isms helps to shift the analysis of construction process
and the performance gap from a list of discrete issues
to an analysis of processes and unintended conse-
quences. As the above examples illustrate, a shift in the
unit of analysis is often the result of a new policy docu-
ment or externally set directive. The contribution of this
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paper is to draw attention to the way in which the choice
of units in client briefs and planning requirements serve
either to obscure or to keep energy generation on the
agenda. In contrast, the imposition of new parameters
is often more internally driven. In the three cases exam-
ined, it involved an appeal by one or more stakeholders
to externally established rules and types of artefacts and
was driven by particular interests. In SCOT terms, insti-
tutional artefacts were used to carve out a space for the
imposition of one technological frame over another in
negotiations around a particular problem/solution.
While the introduction of financial or aesthetic consider-
ations is generally explicit and even strategic, the knock-
on effects of these moves for the performance gap were
unintended. Finally, the primacy of conventions
highlights the pervasive role of ‘business as usual’ in
the adoption of new technologies. Whilst the effect of
taken-for-granted, dominant practice has begun to be
remarked and theorized in the literature on renewable
technology (Fedoruk et al., 2015; Lees & Sexton, 2013)
and is at the centre of analyses of user behaviour
(Gram-Hassen, 2010; Shove, Pantzar, & Watson, 2012),
it is relatively neglected in the growing managerialist lit-
erature on the performance gap. A key contribution of
this paper lies in the detailed documentation of the unin-
tended consequences of schedules, work packages, cost
analyses and even reliance on established relationships.
Conclusions
The exploration of the three cases focused on the gap
between early expectations for BIPV energy generation
and generation as designed at the point of handover. It
investigated the particular (extended) moments in the
production of the performance gap over which construc-
tion professionals have control (and for which they are
responsible). Given the importance and promise of
renewable technologies, these moments are important.
Theoretically, the paper contributes to the development
of SCOT by expanding the range of closure mechanisms
identified from those that depend on negotiation and
consensus to more indirect inflection mechanisms.
These inflection mechanisms highlight the role of
broader institutional arrangements on everyday
decision-making and their consequences for the incor-
poration of new technologies whose systems cut across
established conventions.
The report by the Zero CarbonHub (2014) identified a
number of discrete construction-related factors that
contribute to the gap between building-as-designed and
as-built. The present research builds on that systematic
analysis by exploring how these different factors came
together in three commercial projects. In doing so, it
documents the consequences of a large number of see-
mingly small, independent (non-)decisions about things
which ostensibly have nothing to do with energy gener-
ation on the performance of BIPV/buildings. More gener-
ally, it identifies some of the overlooked challenges
involved in keeping the design of the BIPV system and
energy generation on the agenda and the role of insti-
tutional artefacts such asworkpackages, schedules and cli-
ent requirements in either obscuring or maintaining that
visibility
Theoretically, the use of SCOT, and more specifically
an analysis of problem/solution chains and closure
mechanisms at play, provides a basis on which to expand
the types of closure mechanisms involved in the stabiliz-
ation of new technologies and their associated networks.
In addition to the well-studied cognitive closure mechan-
isms generally discussed in SCOT research, the paper
introduces three types of inflection mechanisms. The
analysis points to the way in which institutional artefacts
shift the unit of analysis, introduce new parameters and
introduce organizational conventions in ways which
compromise the energy performance of the BIPV system
as initially anticipated.
Conversations with colleagues and professionals
suggest that the findings extend to the introduction of
any new integrated technology. As scholars and policy-
makers are fond of saying, construction is a very com-
plex, highly fragmented sector (Gann, 1996; Fernie,
Green, & Weller, 2003; Reichstein, Salter, & Gann,
2005). The claim is generally followed by a list of pro-
blems linked to fragmentation and a call for integration.
The contribution of this paper is to explore in detail
what that integration involves at the project level. Instead
of looking for who can best play the essential integrator
role, the present research asked what gets in the way of
the best laid plans (for low-energy buildings). The
main finding concerns the role of dominant ways of
working and, more specifically, seemingly unrelated
institutional artefacts, which privilege certain criteria
over others, introduce units of analysis, and contribute
to the location of expertise and the sequencing of
decisions. These often have far reaching, but often unin-
tended, consequences for the energy performance of
renewable technologies and the building as a whole.
Practically, the detailed analysis of the ways in which
these different considerations enter into the everyday
work of developing a building suggests a list of issues
that policy-makers, clients, construction professionals
and promoters of BIPV, integrated technology and inno-
vation will want to take into account. These include: a
systematic reflection on the fit between the system
requirements of the new element and conventional div-
isions of labour – be it work packages or schedules;
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explicit reflection on the fit and consequences of differ-
ent metrics and parameters; and an awareness of the
unintended consequences of contractual divisions of
responsibility for the location of expertise. One of the
main responses to the growing recognition of the role
of construction professionals in the performance gap
has been to call for someone, be it the project manager
or an integrator, to take ownership of energy generation
and keep it on the agenda. Without weighing in on
whether this needs to be one person or a more distribu-
ted responsibility, this paper contributes to that argu-
ment by drawing attention to the myriad of often
apparently disconnected micro-level processes and
decisions that need to be taken into account to render
that role effective.
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